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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS 
REGULATION, DIVISION OF 
PUBLIC UTILITIES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; MILLY 0. BERNARD, 
Chairman; OLOF E. ZUNDEL, 
Commissioner; and KENNETH 
RIGTRUP, Commissioner, 
Respondents, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Intervenor-
Respondents. 
Appeal No. 16241 
REPLY BRIEF ON REHEARING OF 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY TO BRIEF 
IN OPPOSITION OF DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company (hereinafter Mountain Fuel) 
herewith files its Reply Brief incident to Rehearing, to the 
Brief in Opposition of the Division of Public Utilities (here-
inafter sometimes Division) under date of September 8, 1980. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In filing this Reply Brief, Mountain Fuel is aware that 
a reply in a case on rehearing is not the usual practice. But 
the Brief in Opposition to Rehearing of the Division of Public 
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Utilities in this matter is not in any sense usual. It 
contains testimonial remarks of Division counsel and new 
material which have never been raised or urged by any party at 
an earlier time. 
Accordingly, this Reply Brief is mandated in order that 
this Court may not be deceived or misled. A reply is proper 
under the attendant facts. 
POINT I 
THE ANSWERING BRIEF OF THE DIVISION IS 
REPLETE WITH TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS OF 
DIVISION COUNSEL. 
The Division Brief in Opposition to the petitions for 
rehea~ing of Mountain Fuel and the Public Service Commission 
is a remarkable if not novel document. The Division counsel, 
Mr. Randle, proffers his personal testimony and experience 
throughout his Brief with respect to the practice and procedure 
1/ 
before various federal and state regulatory commissions.-
This testimonial display is both improper and ironic 
improper for a lawyer to become a witness in a brief and then 
2/ 
argue his own credibility to the Court- --- ironic because 
counsel's testimony is based upon his own personal observation 
of the Utah Public Service Commission in his role as Commission 
staff counsel. 
!/ Pages 2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15 and 16 of the Division's Brief in 
Opposition are examples of the extraordianry, gratuitous evidence 
offered by Mr. Randle in this Case. 
y See Canons of Professional Responsibility of Utah State Bar DR S-102. 
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Division counsel calls attention in footnotes l and 2 of 
his Brief to the appearance of the Commission on Rehearing 
and of the alleged impropriety of that appearance because of 
purported "influence" exerted by Hountain Fuel. As will be 
noted hereafter, the appearance of the Commission is completely 
proper at any phase in this Case, including Rehearing. As to 
the accusation of influence peddling, such is an attack upon 
the integrity and independence of the Commission to act on 
its own. It retained its own legal counsel and submitted its 
own position to this Court on Rehearing. Such was not altogether 
surprising, for the Commission had been patently and wrongfully 
abandoned by its own legal counsel who had opted to represent 
3/ 
the Division staff on appeal rather than the Commission, itself.-
The conduct of the Commission on Rehearing was of its own 
undertaking and not of Mountain Fuel. In light of the abandonment 
by staff counsel and the attack by that counsel on the Commission 
Order, it was neither improper nor surprising that the Commission 
would discuss with Mountain Fuel the issues raised by the Opinion 
of the Court under date of June 19, 1980. 
The testimonial account and personal observation of the 
Division counsel in its Brief are not only procedurally improper, 
but are, in most respects, substantively inaccurate. Counsel's 
diatribe must be addressed in this Reply in order that this 
The statute makes it mandatory for the Attorney General to attend 
the Supreme Court of Utah in behalf of the Public Service Commission. 
G7-5-l(l) U.C.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 7A) 
-3-
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Honorable Court is not deceived or misled on the issues squarely 
presented in the Mountain Fuel Petition for Rehearing. 
POINT II 
THE APPEARANCE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE cor~ISSION 
IS ENTIRELY PROPER AND AUTHORIZED ON AN APPEAL 
AND REHEARING OF ITS ORDER. 
The Division, at page 2 of its Brief in Opposition, 
reaches the quite astonishing conclusion that the Commission's 
appearance in this Case on rehearing is contrary to law. 
After reciting the Commission statement in its Petition for 
Rehearing that it does not normally enter every appeal from 
its Orders, the Division Brief states that such Commission 
expression is "fully consistent with the Supreme Court's 
Opinion herein and is the law." 
The Division position is patently wrong and wrong for the 
wrong reason. The Statute, 54-7-16 U.C.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 
6A) under which an appeal to the Supreme Court is taken from a 
Commission Order, expressly states that the Commission shall 
have standing to appear and be heard before this Court: 
"* * * The Commission and each party to the 
action or proceeding before the Commission 
shall have the right to appear in the review 
proceedings." 
The Commission's statement on page 2 of its rehearing Brief 
that it does not, itself, appear before the Supreme Court "under 
normal circumstances" is no doubt due to the fact that its 
staff counsel has, in the past, "normally appeared" on the 
appeal of a Commission Order and defended and represented the 
Commission position. 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Division counsel is quick to cite in his personal 
testimony on page 14 of the Brief in Opposition the proceedings 
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (formerly Federal 
Power Commission or FPC and hereinafter "FERC"). It turns out 
that FERC regularly appears in federal courts and takes an 
active role, through its staff counsel, in appeals of FERC 
decisions. See for example, Federal Power Commission v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 92 S.Ct. 1827, 32 
L.Ed.2d 369, 375 (1972); Federal Power Commission v. Hope 
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333, 336 
(1944); Blanco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
598 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
It is not too much to suggest that if the Utah Commission 
were to exercise its statutory right and appear in proceedings 
before this Court with regard to an appeal of its own Order, this 
Court would have a better foundation and base upon which to gauge 
the regulatory policy and procedure of the Commission. Such 
would have been unquestionably of significant aid to this Court 
on the main appeal in the Case at Bar. 
POINT III. 
CONTRARY TO THE DIVISION BRIEF, THE LITTLE 
HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT DOES NOT EXPRESS 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
The Division Brief relies upon and quotes extensively from 
the Report of the Commission on the organization of the Execu-
tive Branch of Government (January 15, 1966) in support of the 
-5-
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Division claim that the Utah Legislature, in the 1969 reorgani-
zation of the Department of Business Regulation, intended to 
transfer prosecutorial and investigatorial functions of the 
Commission to the Division of Public Utilities. See Division 
Brief in Opposition, pp. 9-11. The Division reliance is mis-
placed and its quotations flatly erroneous. 
Contrary to the testimony of Mr. Randle and the Division 
Brief, the Little Hoover Commission Report of 1966 was neither a 
study nor the work of a legislative committee of this State and, 
therefore, does not express any "legislative intent". Rather, 
the Report was only a recommendation of a citizen task force. 
Much of it was rejected outright by the 1969 Legislature. In 
point of fact, several recommendations of the Little Hoover 
Report called for the replacement of the Utah Public Service Com-
mission with a "Public Service Division", the latter to be solely 
an executive agency without power to hear and decide regulatory 
4/ 
matters effecting public utilities.- The Little Hoover Report 
further recommended that the Utah Commission, while temporarily 
in existence during a phase-out period, possess no rule-making 
5/ 
authority.- The stubborn fact is that the intent of the 
Little Hoover Report was to replace the Utah Commission with an 
executive agency and transfer its quasi-judicial jurisdiction 
to the very type of administrative court which this Court's 
Opinion of June 19, 1980 will create if that Opinion is not 
y Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch 
of the Government (1966), pp. 212, 214, 265. 
2/ Ibid. at p. 257. 
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reconsidered and modified in this Rehearing. 
It is without contest that the 1969 Legislature, in the 
enactment of the Reorganization Act of the Department of 
Business Regulation, fundamentally disagreed with the major 
policy recommendations of the Little Hoover Report as they 
related to utility regulation. The proposed "Public Service 
Division" was never created and the quasi-judicial and rule-
making authority of the Utah Commission was reaffirmed under 
13-l-l.l and 13-l-1.3 U.C.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 2A). 
The fact that the Legislature acted precisely opposite to 
the Little Hoover recommendations is the strongest indication 
that it had a contrary intent with regard to the continuing 
viability of the Commission as an investigatory and prosecutor-
ial body as well as a quasi-judicial and rule-making agency. 
The testimony of Division counsel and the position of the 
Division in its Brief in Opposition is patently flawed. 
POINT IV 
CONTRARY TO THE DIVISION BRIEF, OTHER 
REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFFS DO NOT 
APPEAL THEIR COMMISSIONS' ORDERS. 
On page 14 of the Division Brief in Opposition, Mr. Randle 
testifies with regard to his "broad familiarity" with the 
regulatory practice and procedure of FERC. The apparent purpose 
of this testimony is to buttress the Division position herein 
that, even though it is admittedly staff to the Utah Commission, 
it has standing to appeal a Commission Order because of an 
-7-
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otherwise resulting conflict between prosecutorial and quasi-
judicial functions. 
Regardless of whether FERC maintains separate staffs for 
internal administrative functions, the whole point is that 
staff counsel of FERC has absolutely no authority to and has 
never undertaken an appeal to the Court of Appeals or otherwise 
6/ 
from a final order of FERC.- While staff counsel of FERC will 
often advocate a position before FERC and oppose before the 
agency a decision or recommendation of an administrative law 
judge, once FERC has decided the case by final order, the func-
tion of staff counsel as to that position is at an end. There-
after, it is the responsibility of staff counsel for FERC to 
support the agency adjudication on appeal. For example, in 
Public Service Commission of West Virginia v. Federal Power 
Commission, 437 F.2d 1234 (4 Cir. 1971), the staff of the FPC 
supported the agency final order, a case in which it, at the 
administrative level, had proposed an opposite result. Mountain 
Gas Co., 42 F.P.C. 305 (1969), reh. de~. 43 F.P.C. 317 (1970). 
1. Reliance on the Missouri Case is Misplaced. 
The Division Brief in Opposition further relies upon State 
ex rel Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Riley, 546 S.W. 2d 792 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977) for the proposition that staff and quasi-
judicial functions should be divided and that the staff has 
standing to appeal its Commission's order. In Missouri Power 
A review of the decisions of the FPC or of FERC and of the opinions 
lssued by Circuit Court of Appeals reflect no instance 1n which 
staff counsel of FERC has attempted to appeal an order of the 
agency. 
-8-
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& Light, the Missouri Legislature had specifically created a 
separate agency to represent consumers, apart from the Missouri 
Utilities Commission, because it was recognized by the Missouri 
courts that the Commission staff and counsel could not challenge 
Commission decisions by way of an appeal. See 546 S.W. 2d at 
7944 5. Missouri Power & Light is authority for the position 
of Mountain Fuel on Rehearing, not the Division of Public 
Utilities. 
2. Reliance Upon an Appearance Before the Commission in a 
Mountain Fuel Case is Fundamentally Misplaced. 
The Division, at pages 16-17 of its Brief in Opposition, 
points to a position taken by staff counsel for the Utah 
Commission in P.S.C. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, P.S.C. 
Docket No. 2906 (1947) as evidence that staff has, in the 
past, taken positions of "vigorous advocacy". The whole 
trouble with the Division's argument in this regard, of course, 
is that the "vigorous advocacy" of staff counsel was before 
the Utah Commission, itself, and not before the Supreme Court 
of Utah in an appeal from a Commission Order. Mountain Fuel 
has no quarrel with the proposition that Commission staff does 
and should take contentious positions before the Commission 
during the course of an administrative rate hearing. But that 
misses the point of this contest before this Court on Rehearing. 
It is the standing to appeal an order of the Commission to this 
Court, not the standing to appear before the P.S.C. that is 
pivotal. 
-9-
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The fact that the Division is required to rely upon a 
proceeding before the Utah Commission vis-a-vis thi~ Court in 
a statutory appeal from a Commission Order to make its argument, 
demonstrates the enormous fallacy of its position on Rehearing. 
POINT V 
THE DIVISION POSITION ON THE COMPOSITION 
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THIS MATTER IS 
SUPERFICIAL AND INVALID. 
The Division argues simplistically that because Justice 
Stewart was not disqualified before oral argument in the Case 
but chose to disqualify himself after oral argument, there was 
no constitutional defect in the Court composition. Such is a 
remarkable argument for the Attorney General of Utah to advance 
in any case. It is to say under such theory, that as long as 
there are five Justices at the time of oral argument of a given 
case, any Justice or two Justices may recuse himself or them-
selves thereafter without notice to the parties for whatever 
reason the Justice may have; so long as there are three Justices 
left to form a quorum, the Attorney General's argument is that 
there is a validly constituted court to render a decision. 
The rationale of the Division is not only specious, it 
poses a clear and present danger to the judicial process. 
Under such arrangement, a Justice could recuse himself sua 
sponte after a matter has been submitted for deter~ination 
because of the difficulty or delicacy of the appeal and leave 
the matter to the remaining Justices to the prejudice of the 
-10-
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judicial system. That is not at all to suggest that the 
recusal of Justice Stewart in the Case at Bar was in any way 
prompted by such motive. But it is to say that the constitutional 
mandate of Article VIII, Section 2 means what it plainly says --
that the Supreme Court "shall consist of five Justices" for the 
decision making process in the appellate review. Under the 
attendant facts, a quorum of the Court of sitting Justices 
will not do. 
Mountain Fuel, and to that end all the parties, were 
denied the constitutional right to a full Court in the resolution 
of this highly important case in public utility law. The 
Court was improperly constituted as a result of the post-
argument recusal of Justice Stewart without the consequent calling 
of a district judge to sit in his place, and, ergo, the Court 
could not constitutionally act. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
The Brief in Opposition of the Division does not attempt to 
meet the Petition for Rehearing of Mountain Fuel or the Com-
mission on the basis of the law or the facts in the record, 
but rather upon the personal remarks and testimony of Division 
counsel. For reasons not apparent, Division counsel takes the 
liberty to exposit his special facts and remarks as though they 
were part of the record of this Case. Regardless of the privi-
leged position which the Division believes it may have reached 
before this Court, it has no license or favor to ignore the 
traditional and established rules of appellate advocacy and 
-11-
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review. The time to stop that type of tactic is now. The 
Brief of the Division should be disregarded in preponderant 
part. 
The Division Brief does not squarely face the issues raised 
by the Petition for Rehearing of Mountain Fuel. It is respect-
fully submitted that the June 19, 1980 Opinion of this Court 
should not and must not stand. The Court was improperly 
constituted. The determination therein that adjustments in 
rates in an abbreviated or summary proceeding must be supported 
by "evidence concerning every significant element in the rate-
making components" is internally inconsistent, implausible, 
and erroneous. The judicial transfer of the investigatory and 
prosecutorial functions of the Commission to the Executive 
Director of Business Regulation is interpretive and substantive 
error. The Division, as the support staff of the Commission, 
lacks standing to appeal an order of its own Commission. This 
Court should so conclude on Rehearing, it is respectfully 
submitted. 
The Petition for Rehearing of Mountain Fuel should be 
granted, the matter reheard, and the main Opinion of June 19, 
1980 should be revised, consistent with the principals at 
large, to affirm the Order of the P.S.C. 
-12-
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of September, 1980. 
R. G. GROUSSMAN 
180 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84139 
Attorneys for Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company 
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